Value And Ethical Objectivity - edizione con copertina flessibile

VALUE AND ETHICAL OBJECTIVITY A Study in Ethical Objectivity and the Objectivity of Value BY GORDON S. JURY LONDON GEORGE ALLEN UNWIN LTD MUSEUM STREET FOREWORD PROFESSOR JURY has, I think, made a real con tribution to the solution of the difficult problem of the nature of ethical objectivity. As he points out in the Introduction to the present work, developments both in ethics proper and in general philosophy brought the problem into the fore ground and made it central in current discussions. Few studies have, I think, grasped so thoroughly the nature and implications of the problem, and his own solution seems to me to be in the right direction. There are two outstanding values which this study will have for the student of ethics. In the first place, the entire treatment reflects the new orientation in ethics brought about by its relation to general value theory and shows a thorough understanding of this dominant tendency in recent ethical theory. In this connection his analysis of the various theories of the relation of ethics to axiology will be found especially valuable. In the second place, his exhaustive study of the meaning of ethical terms idHAiich 1 heeded at the present time. In contrast to the superficial, and often dogmatic, pronouncements on this question, his careful and critical analysis is most welcome. He develops with clearness and skill the arguments for the uniqueness and irreducible character of the intensional import of ethical terms and dis cusses with critical care the question ot their Value and Ethical Objectivity existential reference. In connection with the first point, his discussion of the relation of ethics to psychology and his exposure of the fallacyinvolved in defining the ethical in psychological terms is especially acute. In general, the impossibility of identifying the terms and propositions of ethics with those of any other science is conclusively shown. Professor Jurys insistence upon the view that ethical propositions are not pseudo-propositions involves the entire problem of reference and verification. In this connection his examination of different orders of reference or contexts, and his characterization of the order of reference of ethical propositions, will repay study. His sug gestions for a theory of verification of ethical judgments in the last chapter, while not as fully developed as other parts of his theory, are never theless helpful. It is to be hoped that he will develop them more fully in a later study. WILBUR M. URBAN YALE UNIVERSITY, NEW HAVEN, CONN. November 1936 PREFACE THIS book is, in slightly revised form, a dis sertation presented for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Yale University. It is the outcome of a number of years spent in the teaching of Ethical Theory, during which the place of a critical logical enquiry has had a growing emphasis. The original stimulus in this direction I owe largely to a former colleague in the University of Rangoon, Mr. L. P. Saunders. My indebtedness to modern ethical writers will be obvious from references throughout this essay. I wish to make special acknowledgments to my teachers, Pro fessor James Ten Broeke, whose humble, persistent devotion to the search for Truth inspired under graduate studies in McMaster University Pro fessor D. C. Macintosh, Professor W. H. Sheldon and Professor W, M. Urban, of Yale University Graduate School, during more recent years. It wasmy good fortune to have the special help of consultations with Dr. Urban while writing the dissertation. I only regret that it does not more adequately indicate the great value of the influ ence of these teachers. As it is, I am well aware of the tentative character of the conclusions pre sented. However, they rest on convictions which, I believe, have sound support that Ethical Theory Value and Ethical Objectivity should include an ideal objectivity which is non naturalistic and which has logical independence of metaphysical premises. G. S. J...